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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals his conviction for the crime of
obtaining money by false pretenses.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury for the
crime of obtaining money by false pretenses before the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde of the Second District Court
and from the judgment of guilty, appellant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the judgment of the lower
court be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In January, 1970, Wilford R. Evans saw an advertisement in the Wes tern Livestock Journal explaining that
cattle farmers could increase their net worth one-quarter
million dollars and more without paying profit-depleting
interest, and without large loans to repay.
Mr. Evans contacted appellant, Paul Victor Smith,
and arranged a meeting at which Mr. Smith explained
to Mr. Evans that he could form a corporation and obtain
financing. Mr. Smith assured Mr. Evans that he already
had the necessary investors and capital available (T. 24,
57). Mr. Smith made the following representation to Mr.
Evans: "He said that he had the investors to give me
the funds; he had the money available for it" (T. 52).
Mr. Smith said that he did have some investors available then, but because of his many customers he might
have a slight delay while finding more investors for all
his customers (T. 24). However, Mr. Smith told Mr.
Evans that his (Mr. Evans) financing involved such a
small amount that he already had the money available
and that Mr. Evans wouldn't have to worry about it (T.
46).
The concrete commitment of the investors is shown
from the trial testimony as follows:

1

3

"Q. You thought the whole time that the
money was right there available, the investors had
already committed to pay you the money.
A. He advised me that they had.
Q. He told you that the investors had committed -

A. Right" (T. 46).

Mr. Evans signed a Pre-Incorporation Agreement
with a stock offering clause. Mr. Smith said he had to
have the agreement to protect himself (T. 188). However,
Mr. Evans understood that Mr. Smith was not contemplating a public offering (T. 56).
Mr. Evans paid Mr. Smith $3,100.00 on April 13,
1970. The $3,100.00 was not Mr. Smith's fee, but was to
be used solely for the necessary legal expenses required
to set up a corporation (T. 60, 25).
Mr. Evans testified that he would never have paid
the $3,100.00 had he known that financing was not presently available (T. 39). Mr. Smith has never formed a
corporation for Mr. Evans or drawn up the necessary legal
papers for which he was paid $3,100.00 nor was the $3,100.00 ever returned to Mr. Evans (T. 39). Mr. Smith
also told Mr. Evans that P. V. Smith & Associates was
a corporation (T. 36) ; but P. V. Smith & Associates was
not incorporated (State Exhibit "E").
Mr. Smith's operation was not the result of innocent
mistake or ignorance. The evidence showed that it was
a deliberate and well-planned scheme. John Furster, a
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salesman for P. V. Smith & Associates was instructed to
tell farmers that investors were presently ready (T. 182).
Three other farmers, Rulon Whitesides, Floyd Mingo, and
Russell Pincock, had unfortunate experiences with Mr.
Smith which were similar to those of Mr. Evans'. They
all testified substantially like Mr. Evans.
Mr. Smith told Mr. Whitesides that he, appellant,
was worth millions of dollars (T. 114). Mr. Smith told
Mr. Mingo that the funds were definitely available (T.
148). At one time he told Mr. Mingo that the money was
already in (T. 135). Mr. Smith told Mr. Mingo that he
had incorporated a taxi cab company, an ambulance company in Salt Lake City, and that his total assets were
worth seven million dollars (T. 129).
Eldon Wayne Burnett, an executive vice-president
of P. V. Smith & Associates testified that Mr. Smith had
said that he had four million dollars available for a beauty
salon venture in which he was engaged (T. 80). Mr.
Burnett was told that an excess of $50,000.00 for investments was to come from doctors, including a Dr. C. R.
Gabbert, yet Dr. Gobbert testified that he had never entered into an agreement with Mr. Smith to finance business ventures (T. 159-60).
Mr. Smith induced his customers to part with their
money by making misrepresentations in which he said
that investment money was then available. While Mr.
Smith specifically told Mr. Pincock, Mr. Mingo, Mr.
Whitesides, and Mr. Evans that he had investors and that
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he had the money to buy the cattle, the evidence showed
that he really only made attempts to find such investors.
Investors had not approved any money whatsoever, and
the evidence showed that there never were investors with
money available (T. 191, 82, 182). Mr. Smith never performed any of the promises he made to Mr. Evans, (T.
39), and the evidence demonstrated that Mr. Evans and
others were boldly deceived by a scheme to obtain money
by false pretenses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COMPLAINING WITNESS RELIED TO
HIS DETRIMENT UPON REPRESENTATIONS OF PRESENT MATERIAL FACTS
WHICH THE APPELLANT HAD DELIBERATELY MADE.
Mr. Smith told Mr. Evans that he had investors and
money then available (T. 24, 57, 52, 24, 26, 33-4, 36, 1878). Mr. Smith told Mr. Evans that his business was incorporated (T. 36). Neither of these representations relative to present material facts was true. "A false pretense
is such a fraudulent representation of an existing or past
fact, by one who knows it not to be true, as is adapted
to induce the person to whom it is made to part with
something of value." People v. Orris, 52 Colo. 244, 121
P.163 (1912).
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The jury concluded that Mr. Smith misrepresented
a PRESENT MATERIAL fact. Instruction No. 8 to the
jury read as follows:
"The crime of obtaining property or money
by false pretenses does not lie when based upon
a representation that promisor will do something
in the future, and it is essential that the representation be relative to a material fact."
In State v. Seymour, 49 Utah 285, 163 P. 789 (1917),
although the plaintiff obtained what he bargained for,
(stock), a misrepresentation of the condition of the corporation was enough to sustain conviction. Because the
appellant misrepresented the condition of the corporation,
the court stated: " ... no other inference is permissible '
than that the appellant made the false representations
with the intent to defraud ... " Id. at 790. See also State
v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 262 P. 294 (1927). The differences between present and future representations are
distinguished in A. L. R.:
1

" ... the statement of the defendant that he
'was prepared' to pay indicated an existing intention, as distinguished from one that is prospective
only." 168 A. L. R. 844 (1947).
In State v. G. W. Jones, 73 N. M. 459, 389 P. 2d 398
(1964), the appellant's conviction of obtaining money by
false pretenses was affirmed because:
"Appellant, by stating that he was vice president of the company when in fact, as shown by
the prospectus in his possession he was not, is a
material misrepresentation of a present fact .. ·
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the misrepresentation made by appellant was of
an existing fact." Id. at 401.

Jones, took notice of other constructions regarding future
events:
"Some courts, however, have formed the 'ability' rule, that future representations may imply
a present ability to perform an act and thus
amount to an existing fact. People v. Cohn, 358
Ill. 326, 193 N. E. 150; Hameyer v. State, 148 Neb.
798, 29 N. W. 2d 458."
A more recent view is that expressed in an opinion by

Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court in
People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P. 2d 271 (1954),
wherein the rule in California was stated to be that:
" ... a promise made without intention to perform is a misrepresentation of a state of mind, a
misrepresentation of existing fact, and thus a false
pretense." Id. at 401.

People v. Weitz, 255 P. 2d 40 (1953 Cal. App.),
stresses the importance of a misrepresented material fact:
"A promise although false, will generally not
serve as a pretense; but, where a promise is combined with a representation of fact, there is sufficient pretense unless the prosecution relied wholly
on the promise and not at all on the representation." Id.
A misrepresented fact coupled with a future promise
will sustain a conviction:
"A false pretense as to future facts or events

will not support a conviction for obtaining prop-

erty under false pretenses. However, a false rep-
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resentation or statement regarding a past or exist.
ing fact, accompanied by a promise or statement
as to a future act will support a conviction." A. L.
R., supra, at 840.
"While a mere false promise to do something
in the future is not within the statute, a false
promise of future performance, when coupled with
a false statement as to a past or existing fact, will
support a charge for swindling." McCuistion v.
State, 158 S. W. 2d 527 (Crim. App. Tex. 1942)
at 529.
Inasmuch as the evidence supports the conclusion
that Mr. Smith misrepresented present material facts, the
jury's verdict should be upheld.
POINT II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING THAT
PRESENT MATERIAL FACTS WHICH APPELLANT REPRESENTED TO THE COMPLAINING WITNESS WERE FALSE.
The State presented the following evidence:
1) Appellant did not have money or investors avail·
able at the time of the representation. He had merely
made attempts to find investors (T. 82, 159-60, 181-82).
2) P. V. Smith & Associates was never incorporated,
contrary to appellant's representations (State Exhibit

"E").

3) Mr. Smith's operation was a well-planned scheme
to fraudulently obtain Mr. Evans' money. While successfully perpetrating the same fraud on many others, Mr.
Smith had never secured investors or capital.
The issue whether there was capital available, was
a question for the jury to determine. Although this is a
true statement it was made by the prosecutor and not
the court; however, the silence and actions of the court
may be said to adopt this statement. The court considered the evidence worthy of the jury's consideration.
Zury Instruction No. 6 reads: "That there must have
been false or fraudulent representations or pretenses."
See also .}ury Instruction No. 8.
In Ballaine v. District Court, 107 Utah 247, 153 P.
2d 265 (1944), the Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the
petitioners' conviction of obtaining money under false
pretenses. In Ballaine, the defendants promised the plaintiff title to a 1941 Plymouth free and clear of any liens.
The defendants obtained a $888.66 lien upon the car prior
to plaintiff's payment of the balance. Although defendants made a promise for the future, when they accepted
full payment there was an implied warranty to sell free
of encumbrances. The court held that the circumstances
required honest disclosure, and the defendants committed
"Fraud by silence". The seller of a car must give title
immediately, but the court recognized that this may take
from several minutes to a day or more. As to the charge
that the purchaser was not to have title until a future
time, the court responded:
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"This is untenable. The purchaser was to be
given title immediately after payment. This means
he was to be given title just as soon as this could
possibly be done in the usual performance of busi.
ness. Immediately is defined as 'without interven.
tion; without delay; instantly; at once.'" Id. at
269. (Emphasis added.)
The appellant made false representations as to existing
material facts, and the verdict below ought to be affinned.
POINT III.
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW
FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
WOULD REQUIRE THE COURT TO INTERPOSE ITS JUDGMENT IN PLACE OF THAT
OF THE TRIER OF THE FACT.

The Utah Supreme Court must review evidence in
the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict of the '
District Court and should not overturn the opinion un· t
less the evidence was so clear, credible, and undisputed
that all reasonable minds would agree that the lower
court's holding was erroneous. Memmott v. U. S. Fuel 1
Co., 22 Utah 2d 356, 453 P. 2d 155 (1969). In Taylor v.
Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 414 P. 2d 575 (1964), the :
Supreme Court of Utah said that it was required to view
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and
then it added: "The determination made by the trial
court should not be overturned unless it is made clearly
to appear that it was in error. Id. at 21. (Emphasis
added.)
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In Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d
292, 470 P. 2d 393 (1970), this court held that it would
not review issues on appeal which were not raised below
except to affirm the trial court. The court placed the
burden of proof upon the appellant, by requiring him to
convince this Court that the trial court committed error,
and not that the appellant, in his own opinion, should
have won the case.
In Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 195, 468 P. 2d 369
(1970), this Court held that where a trial court has a
statutory alternative based on discretion, there is a presumption that the trial court's conclusion is clothed with
propriety and bona fides, which presumption is rebutted
only by clear evidence adduced by him who attacks it.
Citizens Gas Co. of New York v. Hackett, 17 Utah 2d 304,
410 P. 2d 767 (1966), held that the Supreme Court has
the following duty: " . . . to indulge the presumption
that the findings and judgment of trial court are correct;
and to affirm unless appellant sustains the burden, which
is his, of demonstrating to the contrary." Id. at 307. State
v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P. 2d 517 (1968), elaborates:
"Due to the responsibility of the trial court
in controlling the admissibility of evidence, and
his advantaged position to pass on such matters,
it is his prerogative to make this determination.
For those reasons his ruling should be indulged
with a presumption of correctness, and should not
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that he was
in error." Id. at 518-19.
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See also Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 17
Utah 2d 181, 407 P. 2d 346 (1965).
The appellant has not met the burden of proof which
is required of him, and this Court must affirm the verdict
of the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The State presented evidence upon which was based
the jury's finding that appellant made false representations relative to present material facts, and upon which
the complaining witness relied to his detriment. The
appellant has failed to meet the burden necessary t.o require a reversal of the verdict of the District Court.
Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

I

